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1 Introduction
Unemployment leads to large and persistent earnings losses that increase in its du-
ration due to skill deterioration. The magnitude of this effect varies over time and
across industries and demographic groups (Rhum, 1991; Jacobson, Lalond and Sulli-
van, 1993a; Davis and vonWacther 2011) as well as countries (Machin and Manning,
1999). Recently, the average duration of unemployment spells in developed economies
has remarkably increased. For example, in the US the share of unemployed workers
who are jobless for more than one year doubled over the Great Recession episode,
reaching 24% of total unemployment in 2014. Krueger, Cramer and Cho (2014) and
Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz (2016) show that the re-employability of the long-
term unemployed progressively declines over time, so that they are more likely to exit
the labour force. More job openings do not lead to more employment among those
who are jobless for more than six months, a pattern holding across all ages, indus-
tries and education levels (Ghayad and Dickens 2012). On the whole, these findings
indicate that long-term unemployment may become a trap, often not supported by
supplementary income provisions, given that unemployment benefits usually decline
rapidly with unemployment duration.
In this paper, we embed the possibility of entering long-term unemployment with
permanent consequences on human capital in a life-cycle model of consumption and
portfolio choice. We model working life careers as a three-state Markov chain driving
the transitions between employment, short-term and long-term unemployment states,
as in Bremus and Kuzin (2014), calibrated to broadly match observed US labour mar-
ket features. Importantly, we allow for (a small probability of) human capital erosion
during unemployment. When unemployed, individuals receive benefits but simultane-
ously experience a cut in the permanent component of labour income which captures
diminished future income prospects. This represents the observed permanent earning
losses (Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor, 2000; Arulampalam, 2001; Schmieder, von
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Wachter and Bender, 2016) due to skill loss during long-term unemployment (Neal,
1995; Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Edin and Gustavsson, 2008).
Such potential loss in human capital considerably lowers the optimal portfolio share
invested in stocks with respect to the case of no unemployment risk. Importantly, op-
timal stock investment is no longer decreasing with age but remains remarkably flat
over the whole working life, in line with evidence on U.S. portfolios (Amkeriks and
Zeldes, 2004). On the contrary, traditional life-cycle models imply that households
should reduce exposure to risky stocks as they approach retirement (Bodie, Merton
and Samuelson, 1992; Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout 2005). The rea-
son is that human capital provides a hedge against shocks to stock returns, making
financial risk bearing more attractive. Investment in stocks should therefore be rela-
tively high at the beginning of working careers, when human capital is large relative
to accumulated financial wealth, and then gradually falling until retirement as human
capital decreases relative to financial wealth. This model implication is embodied in
the popular financial advice of a stock exposure gradually decreasing with age, the
so-called “age rule”. In our model with unemployment traps, such effect is instead
moderated by the resolution of uncertainty concerning labour and pension income,
as the worker safely approaches retirement age. Since the risk of long term unem-
ployment falls together with human capital as retirement approaches, the resolution
of uncertainty compensates the hedge effect and the optimal investment in stocks is
relatively flat over the life-cycle.
The optimal risky portfolios are highly heterogeneous in models without long-term
unemployment traps. On the contrary, a small probability of such personal disaster
shrinks the heterogeneity of optimal portfolio choices across agents characterized by
different employment histories. In the face of possible, albeit rare, human capital de-
preciation, individuals accumulate substantially more financial wealth during working
life to buffer possible adverse labour market outcomes. Optimal early consumption
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consequently falls, becoming higher during both late working years and retirement
years. The working-year responses to unemployment risk, including the flat age profile
in stock investment, are remarkably robust to changes in preferences on the intertem-
poral correlation of shocks. Allowing for Epstein-Zin preferences only causes slower
wealth decumulation and less risk taking during retirement years. Similarly, an in-
crease in the correlation between stock returns and labour income shocks leaves the
flat shape of optimal equity investment during working age unaltered, only increas-
ing the portfolio share allocated to the riskfree asset. Thus, it is unemployment risk,
due to uninsured long term unemployment, the first order determinant of the optimal
financial risk taking at different ages.
This is not the first paper that explicitly connects life cycle precautionary savings
to social insurance in general (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995) and to the partial
one against employment risk in particular (Low, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010). Our
analysis uncovers the link between the share of long-term unemployment risk that
is left uninsured and the path of optimal equity risk taking during working years.
In this respect, acknowledging the presence of unemployment traps delivers relevant
consequences for the design of pension fund default investment rules. Absent traps,
welfare losses due to the use of simple age rules are below 1% of annual consumption
in standard calibrations (Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005; Love, 2013), while they
are above 3% when allowing for traps that are left uninsured by unemployment bene-
fits. Such losses easily reach 10% of consumption for investment rules mimicking the
ones embedded in Target Date Funds. They are due to both excessive financial risk
taking when the young worker confronts higher uncertainty about his future labour
and pension income, and by insufficient financial risk taking when this uncertainty is
resolved. These suboptimal rules lead to lower consumption during retirement.
The above results obtain in calibrations to US data. The implied unconditional
probabilities of being short-run unemployed (384%) and long-run unemployed (016%)
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are rather conservative, and the unemployment benefit replacement rate is set at the
average level observed for the US. As for human capital erosion, it is respectively
equal to 0% and 60% in case of short-term and long-term unemployment spells in
a calibration that captures the relatively slow re-employment process experienced by
US workers. We select the human capital erosion during long-term unemployment
considering both the total loss of human capital for the fraction of workers abandoning
the labor force, and the partial loss for those who are able to find a job. Results go
through when the erosion parameter is reduced to 50%, and when the probability of
moving into long-term unemployment from an initial unemployment state is reduced
by a third (from 015 to 010). We also experiment with a stochastic human capital
loss conditional on long-term unemployment, to represent the possibility of incurring
into large losses only in deep crisis situations rather than in normal business cycle
downturns. In this case, our results go through even when the expected erosion is as
low as 10%-20% of the permanent labour income component after the second year of
unemployment.
Previous life-cycle models with unemployment and self-insurance leave the observed
age pattern of stock holding during working life largely unexplained. Some versions of
the life-cycle model account for the risk of being unemployed by introducing a (small)
positive probability of zero labour income: in these models unemployment risk af-
fects income only during the unemployment spell with no consequences on subsequent
earnings ability (Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005) even when unemployment is
persistent (Bremus and Kuzin, 2014). With no permanent consequence on subsequent
earnings ability, the stock holding is still counterfactually decreasing in age till re-
tirement although, on average, lower than what obtained without unemployment risk.
Thus, it is the possibility of unemployment traps - rather than unemployment per
se - that restrains risk taking by the young and middle-aged workers. Therefore, our
model draws attention to a scenario opposite to the one depicted by Bodie, Merton
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and Samuelson (1992) and Gomes, Kotlikoff and Viceira (2008), where the worker is
able - if employed - to modify labour supply to buffer income shocks. In fact, we
know that flexible labour supply may enhance risk-taking thereby compressing pre-
cautionary saving and reducing consumption after retirement. However, this option is
available ex-post only to those long-term unemployed who do find a new job, while it
is the ex ante risk of permanently losing human capital that drives our results.
Several papers already investigate alternative hypotheses that may deliver the rel-
atively flat stock profile observed in the data, departing from the pattern implied by
traditional life-cycle models. Some of this prior research already relate the resolution
of uncertainty over working life to the flattening of the age profile of stock investment.
Hubener, Maurer and Mitchell (2016) point to the risk of changing family status dur-
ing working age (i.e. marriage, fertility, divorce..), which affects consumption both
directly and through labour supply. In Bagliano, Fugazza and Nicodano (2014), such
flattening depends on the presence of both another risky asset, besides equities, and a
positive correlation between stock returns and permanent labor income shocks. More-
over, it only appears when risk aversion or the variance of labor income shocks are
higher than in the baseline calibration of Cocco Gomes and Maenhout (2005). In our
model, the flat profile is robust to an in-depth sensitivity analysis and derives from the
possibility of a rare personal labour market disaster, in an otherwise standard baseline
setting.
This disaster differs from both the individual stock market disaster modeled in
Fagereng, Guiso and Gottlieb (2017) and the aggregate economic collapse explaining
asset pricing puzzles in Barro (2006), both of which concern financial wealth and may
occur during retirement, as well. It instead reminds of the rare idiosyncratic disaster in
Schmidt (2016), that appears to capture both the magnitude and the dynamics of the
equity risk premium. Such rare personal disaster makes returns to human capital neg-
atively skewed, a feature recently uncovered in the data by Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan
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and Song (2015). In this light, our paper documents the large effects of non-normal
shocks to labour income on life-cycle savings and investment, following the sugges-
tion in Blundell (2014) of introducing higher moments and nonlinearities in shocks to
labour income. Thus, our paper extends the literature on portfolio choice that has
so far focused only on non-Gaussian returns to financial assets (see e.g. Guidolin and
Timmerman, 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark
life-cycle model and briefly outlines the numerical solution procedure adopted. We
detail the model calibration in Section 3 and discuss our main results in Section 4.
Section 5 provides a quantitative assessment of the welfare loss entailed by departing
from optimal asset allocation profiles and adopting conventional age-related investment
rules. Several robustness checks are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 The life-cycle model
We model an investor who maximizes the expected discounted utility of consumption
over her entire life and wishes to leave a bequest as well. The investor starts working
at age 0 and retires with certainty at age 0+. The effective length of her life, which
lasts at most  periods, is governed by age-dependent life expectancy. At each date
, the survival probability of being alive at date  + 1 is , the conditional survival
probability at  (with 0−1 = 1). Investor’s  preferences at date  are described by a
time-separable power utility function:
1−0
1−  +0
" X
=1

Ã−2Y
=0
0+
!Ã
0+−1
1−0+
1−  + (1− 0+−1) 
(0+)1−
1− 
!#
(1)
where  is the level of consumption at time ,  is the amount of wealth the investor
leaves as a bequest to her heirs in case of death,  ≥ 0 is a parameter capturing the
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strength of the bequest motive,   1 is a utility discount factor, and  is the constant
relative risk aversion parameter.
2.1 Labour and retirement income
During working life individuals receive exogenous stochastic earnings as compensation
for labour supplied inelastically. Working life careers are modelled as a three-state
Markov chain considering employment (), short-term (1) and long-term (2) unem-
ployment. Individual labour market dynamics are driven by the following transition
matrix:
Π+1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
 1 2
1 11 12
2 21 22
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
 1−  0
1 0 1− 1
2 0 1− 2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(2)
where  = Prob (+1 = | = ) with   =  1 2. If the worker is employed at 
( = ), she continues the employment spell at + 1 (+1 = ) with probability ,
otherwise she enters short-term unemployment (+1 = 1) with probability 1 =
1− . Since to become long-term unemployed she must first experience short-term
unemployment, we set the probability for the employed to directly enter long-term
unemployment at zero, 2 = 0. The short-term unemployed at  ( = 1) exits
unemployment (+1 = ) with probability 1 or becomes long-term unemployed
(+1 = 2) with probability 12 = 1− 1; consequently we set 11 = 0. Finally,
if she is long-term unemployed at  ( = 2), she is re-employed in the following
period (+1 = ) with probability 2 and remains unemployed with probability
22 = 1− 2.
As in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), the employed individual receives a
stochastic labour income driven by permanent and transitory shocks. In each working
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period, labour income  is generated by the following process:
 =  0 ≤  ≤ 0 + (3)
where  =  (Z) represents the permanent income component. In particular,
 (Z) ≡  denotes the deterministic trend component that depends on age () and
a vector of individual characteristics (Z) such as gender, marital status, household
composition and education. Consistent with the available empirical evidence, the
logarithm of the stochastic permanent component is assumed to follow a random walk
process:
log = log−1 +  (4)
where  is distributed as (0 2).  denotes the transitory stochastic component
and log() is distributed as (0 2) and uncorrelated with .
In our set-up, differently from Bremus and Kuzin (2014), labour income received by
the employed individual at time  depends on her past working history. In particular,
we allow unemployment and its duration to affect the permanent component of labour
income, . Since the empirical evidence suggests that the longer the unemployment
spell the larger is the worker’s human capital depreciation (Schmieder, von Wachter
and Bender, 2016), we let human capital erosion increase with unemployment duration.
Thus, after one-year unemployment the permanent component  is equal to −1
eroded by a fraction Ψ1, and after a two-year unemployment spell the permanent
component, −1, is eroded by a fraction Ψ2, with Ψ2  Ψ1. This introduces a
non-linearity in expected permanent labour income. In compact form, the permanent
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component of labour income  evolves according to:
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 (Z) if  =  and −1 = 
(1−Ψ1)−1 if  =  and −1 = 1
(1−Ψ2)−1 if  =  and −1 = 2
 = 0  0 + (5)
In the short-term unemployment state ( = 1) individuals receive an unemploy-
ment benefit as a fixed proportion 1 of the previous year permanent income −1 =
−1−1, whereas in the long-term unemployment state ( = 2) no benefits are
available: 2 = 0. Thus, the income received during unemployment is:
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1−1 if  = 1 and −1 = 
0 if  = 2 and −1 = 1 and −2 = 
 = 0  0 + (6)
making the unconditional distribution of labour income no longer log-normal.
Finally, during retirement, income is certain and equal to a fixed proportion  of
the permanent component of labour income in the last working year:
 =  ¡Z0+¢0+ 0 +   ≤  (7)
where retirement age is 0 +, 0 +  is the last working period and  is level of the
replacement rate.
2.2 Investment opportunities
We allow savings to be invested in a short-term riskless asset, yielding each period a
constant gross real return  , and one risky asset, characterized as “stocks” yielding
stochastic gross real returns  . The excess returns of stocks over the riskless asset
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follows
 − =  +  (8)
where  is the expected stock premium and  is a normally distributed innovation,
with mean zero and variance 2. We do not allow for excess return predictability and
other forms of changing investment opportunities over time, as in Michaelides and
Zhang (2017).
At the beginning of each period, financial resources available to the individual for
consumption and saving are given by the sum of accumulated financial wealth and
current labour income , that we call cash on hand  =+ . Given the chosen
level of current consumption, , next period cash on hand is given by:
+1 = ( − ) + +1 (9)
where  is the investor’s portfolio return:
 =  + (1− ) (10)
with  and (1− ) denoting the shares of the investor’s portfolio invested in stocks
and in the riskless asset respectively. We do not allow for short sales and assume
that the investor is liquidity constrained, so that the nominal amounts invested in
stocks and in the riskless asset are non negative in all periods. All simulation results
presented below are derived under the assumption that the investor’s asset menu is
the same during working life and retirement.
2.3 Solving the life-cycle problem
In this intertemporal optimization framework, the investor maximizes the expected
discounted utility over life time, by choosing the consumption and the portfolio rules
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given uncertain labour income and asset returns. Formally, the optimization problem
is written as:
max
{}−10 {}−10
Ã1−0
1−  +0
" X
=1

Ã−2Y
=0
0+
!Ã
0+−1
1−0+
1−  +
+(1− 0+−1) (0+)
1−
1− 
!#!
(11)
 +1 = ( − ) ¡ + (1− )¢+ +1 (12)
with the labour income and retirement processes specified above and the no-short-sales
and borrowing constraints imposed. Given its intertemporal nature, the problem can
be restated in a recursive form, rewriting the value of the optimization problem at the
beginning of period  as a function of the maximized current utility and of the value
of the problem at + 1 (Bellman equation):
 ( ) = max
{}−10 {}−10
µ1−
1−  +  [+1 (+1+1 +1)
+ (1− ) (+1)
1−
1− 
#!
(13)
At each time  the value function  describes the maximized value of the problem
as a function of three state variables: cash on hand at the beginning of time  (),
the stochastic permanent component of income at beginning of  (), and the labour
market state (=  1 2). The Bellman equation can be written by making the
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expectation over the employment state at + 1 explicit, as:
 ( ) = max
{}−10 {}−10
µ1−
1− 
+ 
⎡
⎣
X
+1=12
 (+1|)g +1 (+1+1 +1)
+ (1− ) 
X
+1=12
 (+1|) (+1)
1−
1− 
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠ (14)
where g +1 denotes the expectation operator taken with respect to the stochastic
variables +1 +1 and +1. The history dependence that we introduce in our set-
up, by making unemployment affect subsequent labour income prospects, prevents us
to rely on the standard normalization of the problem with respect to the level of 
To highlight how the evolution of the permanent component of labour income depends
on previous individual labour market dynamics we write the value function at , in
each possible state, as (dropping the term involving the bequest motive):
(  ) = () + 
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
+1(+1 +1 ) with prob. 
with +1 = +1 and
+1 = ( − ) + +1+1+1
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
+1(+1 +1 1) with prob. 1− 
with +1 = (1−Ψ1) and
+1 = ( − ) + 1
(  1) = ()+
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
+1(+1 +1 ) with prob. 1
with +1 = (1−Ψ1)−1 +1 =  +1 and
+1 = ( − ) + −1+1+1
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
+1(+1 +1 2) with prob. 1− 1
with +1 = (1−Ψ2)(1−Ψ1)−1 = (1−Ψ2) and
+1 = ( − )
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 (  2) = () + 
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
+1(+1 +1 ) with prob. 2
with +1 = +1 and
+1 = ( − ) + −2+1+1
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
+1(+1 +1 2) with prob. 1− 2
with +1 = (1−Ψ2) and
+1 = ( − )
(15)
This problem has no closed form solution: hence we obtain the optimal values
for consumption and portfolio shares, depending on the values of each state variable
at each point in time, by means of numerical techniques. To this aim, we apply
a backward induction procedure starting form the last possible period of life  and
computing optimal consumption and portfolio share policy rules for each possible value
of the continuous state variables ( and ) by means of the standard grid search
method.1 Going backwards, for every period  = −1 −2  0, we use the Bellman
equation (14) to obtain optimal rules for consumption and portfolio shares.
1The problem is solved over a grid of values covering the space of both the state variables and the
controls in order to ensure that the obtained solution is a global optimum.
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3 Calibration
Parameter calibration concerns investor’s preferences, the features of the labour income
process during working life and retirement, and the moments of the risky asset returns.
For reference, we initially solve the model abstracting from the unemployment risk as
in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005). Then, we introduce unemployment risk and
consider two scenarios: (i) unemployment spells cause only temporary income losses
as in Bremus and Kuzin (2014), and (ii) unemployment has permanent consequences
on the worker’s earnings ability.
Across all scenarios, the agent begins her working life at the age of 20 and works
for (a maximum of) 45 periods () before retiring at the age of 65. After retirement,
she can live for a maximum of 35 periods until the age of 100. In each period, we take
the conditional probability of being alive in the next period  from the life expectancy
tables of the US National Center for Health Statistics. As regards to preferences, we
set the utility discount factor  = 096, and the parameter capturing the strength of
the bequest motive  = 25 (which bears the interpretation of the number of years
of her descendants’ consumption that the investor intends to save for). Finally, the
benchmark value for the coefficient of relative risk aversion is  = 5. The latter choice
is relatively standard in the literature (Gomes and Michaelides 2005; Gomes, Kotlikoff
and Viceira 2008), capturing an intermediate degree of risk aversion, though Cocco,
Gomes and Maenhout (2005) and Bremus and Kuzin (2014) choose a value as high as
10 in their benchmark setting. The riskless (constant) interest rate is set at 002, with
an expected equity premium  fixed at 004. The standard deviation of the return
innovations is set at  = 0157. Finally, we impose a zero correlation between stock
return innovations and aggregate permanent labour income disturbances ( = 0).
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark values of relevant parameters as well as their
changes considered in our subsequent analysis and robustness checks.
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3.1 Labour income and unemployment risk
The labour income process is calibrated using the estimated parameters for US house-
holds with high-school education (but not a college degree) in Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (2005).
The share of long term unemployment in total unemployment is fairly similar
across all education groups (Katz et al., 2016). For instance, Mayer (2015) observes
that the percentage of unemployed workers who have been out of work for two years
or more with a high school degree (12.8%) and with a bachelor’s degree (13.5%) do
not statistically differ. For the high-school group we analyze, the variances of the
permanent and transitory shocks ( and  respectively) are equal to 2 = 00106
and 2 = 00738, and, after retirement, income is a constant proportion  of the final
(permanent) labour income, with  = 0682. The parameter values assumed above are
maintained across all scenarios.
The resulting labour income process does not capture the evidence in Krueger,
Cramer and Cho (2014) that the long-term unemployed experience a progressive declin-
ing re-employability over time and are more likely to exit the labour force. We use
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to calibrate the transition probabili-
ties from employment to unemployment to reflect the risk of entering unemployment
beside the observed average unemployment rates at different durations. According to
the evidence based on CPS reported in Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz (2016),
the annual transition probability from employment to unemployment is 4%. Given
the duration dependence and the steady decline in the annual outflow rate from un-
employment to employment during the first year of unemployment (Kroft, Lange,
Notowidigdo and Katz, 2016), we set the probability to leave unemployment after the
first year at 85%. Our calibration appears quite conservative, since the chance of being
employed 15 months later for those who had been unemployed 27 weeks or more is
2For a more realistic Social Security System design and its implications on retirement, consumption
and investment decisions see Hubener, Maurer and Mitchell (2016).
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only 36% (see the evidence on CPS data in Krueger, Cramer and Cho, 2014).
The annual transition probabilities between labor market states are chosen to
match the average annual unemployment rate in the US:
Π+1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
096 004 0
085 0 015
085 0 015
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(16)
The assumed transition matrix (16) yields quite conservative unconditional probabili-
ties of being short-run (47%) and long-run unemployed (08%), compared to the 2015
overall (5,3%) anhd long-term (1.7%) unemployment rates.
In our baseline calibration with “unemployment traps” we assume a non-negligible
human capital depreciation following a two-year unemployment spell. While Ψ1 is
kept at 0, Ψ2 is increased up to 06, implying a 60% erosion of the individual per-
manent labour income component after the second year of unemployment, capturing
the long lasting effects of protracted inactivity on job careers. Well established em-
pirical evidence on job displacement shows that job losses affect earnings far beyond
the unemployment spell, though the range of the estimated effects varies consider-
ably. For example, the estimates for immediate losses following displacement may
range from 30% (Couch and Placzek, 2010) to 40% of earnings (Jacobson, Lalond
and Sullivan,1993b). Earnings losses are shown to be persistent in a range from 15%
(Couch and Placzek, 2010) to about 25% (Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993a) of
their pre-displacement levels. These estimates abstract from the effect of unemploy-
ment duration, while Cooper (2013) finds that earnings losses are larger the longer
unemployment lasts. Also, based on administrative data, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sul-
livan (2005) estimate that earnings losses for displaced workers amount, on average,
to 43-66% of their pre-displacement wage. This body of evidence, combined with a
probability of finding a job after being unemployed for 24 months as low as 40% (Kroft,
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Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz, 2016), leads us to calibrate a substantial expected drop
in human capital following a long term unemployment spell. More precisely,we derive
the baseline value for the parameter Ψ2 by considering a probability of leaving the
labour force, losing all human capital, equal to 03 and a 07 probability of finding a
new job with a 40% cut in wage.
Unemployment benefits are calibrated on the US unemployment insurance system.
In particular, considering that the replacement rate with respect to last labour income
is on average low and state benefits are paid for a maximum of 26 weeks, we set 1 = 03
in case of short-term unemployment spells and set a value of 2 = 0 for the long-term
unemployed. No additional weeks of federal benefits are available in any state: the
temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program expired at the
end of 2013, and no state currently qualifies to offer more weeks under the permanent
Extended Benefits (EB) program.3
For comparison, we also consider a calibration of the model without unemployment
risk. This “no unemployment risk” scenario corresponds to the standard life-cycle set
up with  = 1 and all other entries equal to zero in the transition probability matrix
(2). In addition, to highlight the effects of permanent consequences of unemployment
on future earnings prospects, we consider a third calibration by adding the unemploy-
ment risk embedded in the transition probability matrix (16) with no human capital
erosion. In this “unemployment with no traps” scenario, unemployment has no per-
manent consequences on future earnings (i.e. Ψ1 = Ψ2 = 0) but entails only a cut
in current income. This case closely correspond to the set-up studied by Bremus and
Kuzin (2014) who focus only on temporary effects of long-term unemployment.
3Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) acknowledge that layoffs are partially insured by the unem-
ployment insurance system, while individual productivity shocks, other than major observable health
shocks, are rarely insured in any formal way. As for other welfare programs, we do not model basic
consumption needs and therefore overlook basic consumption insurance.
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4 Results
4.1 Optimal policies
Figure 1 compares investors’ optimal stock shares in the standard case of “no unem-
ployment risk” (panel (a)) and in our preferred scenario with “unemployment traps”
(panel (b)). In particular, the figure plots the optimal stock share as a function of cash
on hand for an average level of the permanent labour income component of investors
of three different ages (20, 40, and 70). In the case with no unemployment risk, stan-
dard life-cycle results obtain. Labour income acts as an implicit risk-free asset and
affects the optimal portfolio composition depending on investor’s age and wealth. For
example, at age 20 the sizable implicit holding of the risk-free asset (through human
capital) makes it optimal for the less wealthy investors to tilt their portfolio towards
the risky financial asset. Indeed, for a wide range of wealth levels, agents optimally
choose to be fully invested in stocks. The optimal stock holding decreases in financial
wealth because of the relatively lower implicit investment in (risk-free) human capital.
When the model is extended to allow for permanent effects of unemployment spells
on labour income prospects at re-employment (“unemployment traps”), setting the
parameters governing the proportional erosion of permanent labour income at Ψ1 = 0
after one year of unemployment and at Ψ2 = 06 after two years, the resulting policy
functions are shifted abruptly leftward. The optimal stock share is still decreasing in
financial wealth but a 100% share of investment in stocks is optimal only at very low
levels of wealth. In this case, long-term unemployment implies the loss of a substantial
portion of future labour income which severely reduces the level of human capital and
increases its risk at any age. Thus, for almost all levels of financial wealth, stock
investment is considerably lower than in the case of no unemployment risk.
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4.2 Life-Cycle Profiles
On the basis of the optimal policy functions, we simulate the whole life-cycle con-
sumption and investment decisions for 10,000 agents. Figure 2, panel (a), shows the
average optimal stock shares plotted against age obtained when unemployment risk is
ignored and when it is accounted for. In the case of no unemployment risk (dotted
line), the well known result on the age profile of optimal stock portfolio shares obtains.
Over the life cycle the proportion of overall wealth implicitly invested in the riskless
asset through human capital declines with age. Consequently, at early stages of the
life cycle, optimal stock investment is about 100% and decreases with age to reach
around 80% at retirement. When unemployment risk without human capital erosion
is considered (dashed line), the optimal portfolio share of stocks still declines with age,
though being slightly lower at all ages, with a 100% optimal stock share only for very
young investors.
However, when long-term unemployment implies a rare but large skill erosion (solid
line), the optimal stock investment is sizably reduced at any age and almost flat around
55-60%. The risk of permanently losing a substantial portion of future labour income
prospects reduces the level of human capital and increases its riskiness, the more
so the younger is the worker, inducing a lower optimal stock investment conditional
on financial wealth especially when young. Consequently, the age profile remains
remarkably flat over the whole working life.4 These results highlight that possible
long-run consequences of unemployment significantly dampen the incentive to invest
in stocks, under standard calibrations, whereas unemployment persistence, with only
temporary income losses as in Bremus and Kuzin (2014), has almost no effect on the
age profile of optimal portfolio composition.
The reduction in the optimal portfolio share allocated to stocks is due to higher
4The relatively low investment in stocks during retirement is due to the presence of a positive
bequest motive, common to all parametrizations considered in the paper.
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wealth accumulation, in turn induced by larger precautionary savings.5 Panel (b) of
Figure 2 displays the average financial wealth accumulated over the life cycle for the
three scenarios considered. In the face of possible, albeit rare, human capital deprecia-
tion, individuals accumulate substantially more financial wealth during working life to
buffer possible disastrous labor market outcomes. Optimal consumption when young
consequently falls, but it is much higher during both late working years and retire-
ment years. Figure 3 displays the life-cycle profile of the ratio between savings and
total (financial plus labour) income, comparing the case without unemployment risk
with the one with unemployment traps. When the worker is 20 years old, the average
propensity to save is especially high in the latter case, reaching 08 compared with less
than 02 when unemployment risk is absent. Such propensity monotonically decreases
in age, converging to the known pattern when the worker is in her forties. The figure
clearly depicts the impact on savings of the resolution of uncertainty as individuals
age.
4.2.1 Heterogeneity
The above results imply that the optimal stock investment is flat in age, even for a
moderately risk averse worker. In the face of a very rare but large human capital
depreciation, workers on average invest in stocks about 55% of their financial wealth.
This average pattern may hide considerable differences across agents. The present
section investigates the distribution across agents of both conditional optimal stock
share and accumulated wealth.
The case of no unemployment risk is displayed in panel (a) of Figure 4, which
shows the 25, 50 and 75 percentiles of the distributions. Both the optimal stock
share and the stock of accumulated financial wealth are highly heterogeneous across
5Love (2006) shows that higher unemployment insurance benefits reduce calibrated contributions
to pension funds by the young, suggesting that precautionary savings when young is due to unem-
ployment risk.
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workers as well as retirees, with the exception of young workers who tilt their entire
portfolio towards stocks given the relatively riskless nature of their human capital.
Heterogeneity of portfolio shares depends on the shape and movements through age of
the policy functions displayed in Figure 1, relating optimal stock shares to the amount
of available cash on hand, and on the level of cash on hand itself. Relatively steep policy
functions imply that even small differences in the level of accumulated wealth result in
remarkably different asset allocation choices. At the early stage of the life cycle, when
accumulated financial wealth is modest, it is optimal for everybody to be fully invested
in stocks. As investors grow older, different realizations of background risk induce large
differences in savings and wealth accumulation pushing investors on the steeper portion
of their policy functions and determining a gradual increase in the heterogeneity of
optimal risky portfolio shares during their working life. After retirement, investors
decumulate their financial wealth relatively slowly, due to the bequest motive, and still
move along the steeper portion of their relevant policy functions; as a consequence,
the dispersion of optimal shares tends to persist.
Panel (b) of Figure 4 displays the life-cycle distribution of stock share and financial
wealth for the case with unemployment risk and human capital erosion. Compared
with the case of no unemployment risk, the distribution of optimal stock shares is
much less heterogeneous over the whole life-cycle. In particular, heterogeneity shrinks
during working life even for young workers given the high human capital risk they
bear at the beginning of their careers. In case of unemployment risk, policy functions
are relatively flat (see panel (b) of Figure 1) implying that even large differences in
the level of accumulated wealth result in homogenous asset allocation choices. Then,
as in the previous case, the shape of heterogeneity of stock shares and accumulated
financial wealth over the life-cycle is due to different realizations of background risk.
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5 Welfare analysis of suboptimal choices
Workers usually delegate to their pension funds the task of managing long term saving
on their behalf. The strategies proposed by portfolio managers often embed the feature
of a decreasing age profile of investment in the riskier assets, with a portfolio share
in stocks often in excess of 80% when young. These strategies resemble the ones
that are optimal in the absence of unemployment risk. In fact, Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (2005) measure that the representative worker should enjoy only a slightly
higher (0.64%) consumption level to be compensated for the adoption of a suboptimal
“age rule” by her pension fund. Bagliano, Fugazza and Nicodano (2014) find that a
compensation of a similar amount is needed when the investor’s asset menu includes
also bonds, unless there is positive correlation between stock returns and permanent
income shocks.6 Love (2013) finds even lower welfare losses when optimizing over the
parameters of the rule of thumb.
This section provides a quantitative assessment of the welfare loss associated with
the adoption of simple portfolio allocation rules of thumb related to age when there
are rare unemployment traps. We also explore an alternative suboptimal situation,
where the worker adopts the utility-maximizing consumption and portfolio allocation
but ignores the possibility of unemployment traps. This case is inspired by the scant
discussion of long-term unemployment in the US prior to the recent crisis, which
points to underestimation of the problem before 2007. The crisis may have generated
a structural break in the economy, aggravating the long-term unemployment problem;
or it may have enhanced the awareness of the rare occurrence of unemployment traps.
The analysis of this case also delivers an upper bound to the welfare gains achievable
when workers switch to the optimal asset allocation taking into account the potential
occurrence of long-term unemployment spells with permanent consequences on their
6Only in the case of positive correlation, the compensating consumption is higher and may reach
3.9% for the benchmark risk aversion parameter ( = 5).
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earnings prospects.
In particular, we consider two suboptimal asset allocation patterns related to the
investor’s age. The first is the typical “age rule” analyzed by Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (2005), with a risky portfolio share set at 100 less the investor’s age.7 The
second rule of thumb, denoted as “target-date fund (TDF) rule”, comes closer to ac-
tual strategic asset allocation patterns adopted by Target-Date Funds. As shown in
panel (a) of Figure 5, the stock portfolio share is set at 90% until the age of 40, is
gradually decreased over the remaining working life down to 50% at the retirement age
(65), and is further reduced in the early retirement period to reach a bottom of 30%
at the age of 72. This TDF rule reminds of the one investigated by Bagliano, Fugazza
and Nicodano (2014) with also bonds in the investor’s asset menu. The metric used
to perform welfare comparisons is the standard consumption-equivalent variation em-
ployed by Cocco, Gomes andMaenhout (2005). We compute the percentage increase in
annual consumption required by the investor to obtain the same level of expected util-
ity warranted by the optimal life-cycle strategy for each suboptimal asset allocation
rule. The consumption-equivalent variation is obtained by simulating consumption
and wealth accumulation choices of 10,000 agents following the optimal asset alloca-
tion strategy and each of the alternative (suboptimal) investment rules, and deriving
the associated expected discounted life-time utility levels. From the average expected
discounted utility across individuals, the constant consumption stream needed to com-
pensate investors (in each period and state) for the adoption of suboptimal strategies
is computed using the CRRA utility function. Throughout our comparisons, we adopt
the benchmark calibration parameters reported in Table 1.
The left-hand side of Table 2 shows the welfare gains associated with switching
from the “age rule” to the optimal portfolio choice. Both the mean and the median
7In a variant of this “age rule”, the worker starts saving for retirement 40 years before the target
retirement date, setting the initial share of stocks at 80% and letting it fall to 40% at retirement
(Bodie, Treussard and Willen, 2007).
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increase in welfare-equivalent consumption are equal to 3.3%. Welfare gains are three
times larger than prior estimates in the literature. Such gains derive from the fact
that consumption and savings are distorted by both the higher risk taking when the
worker faces a large amount of uncertainty about future labour and pension income,
and by lower risk taking when uncertainty is resolved. Average consumption (panel
(b) of Figure 5) is close to the optimal one during early working years under the “age
rule”, but it is much lower during retirement. Moreover, as shown in panel (c), while
wealth accumulation until age 55 is close to the optimal one, average financial wealth
at retirement and thereafter turns out to be lower under the “age rule”. This pattern
is due to agents who, having incurred in a trap, save less and ultimately - given the
quick reallocation towards the riskless asset - are also able to consume and bequeath
less. Those workers who do not experience personal disasters are able to set aside
more wealth, but gradual conversion into the riskless asset reduces the return on the
financial wealth relative to investors adopting optimal portfolio shares. The pattern
of welfare gains across income brackets is however surprising, as revealed by panel (b)
of Table 2. Mean welfare gains when income, at age 64, is below the 5th percentile
of income distribution is lower than for agents with incomes above the 95th percentile
(1.6% versus 2.4%). We tentatively ascribe such result to the fact that a distorted
portfolio rule delivers lower utility losses at the bottom of the income distribution,
because of lower financial wealth.
The middle column of Table 2 displays welfare gains when the investor adopts the
optimal asset allocation pattern instead of the “TDF rule”, with the stock portfolio
share exceeding the one dictated by the “age rule” until age 55 and later falling be-
low it. Given that there is higher exposure to financial risk early in life and lower
exposure during retirement, mean and median welfare gains from adopting the opti-
mal portfolio rule are much higher (above 10% of yearly consumption). This pattern
emerges despite two seeming improvements, highlighted in Figure 5. The first is that
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mean consumption under a TDF portfolio allocation is higher, from age 30 until age
80, than consumption under the optimal portfolio rule. The second is that mean fi-
nancial wealth exceeds the optimal one until past age 80. The increased consumption
during working life and early retirement is thus more than offset by the marked reduc-
tion during later retirement years, followed by lower bequest. Once again, the mean
welfare gains are lower for those with income (at age 64), below the 5th percentile
of income distribution than for those with incomes above the 95th percentile (9.5%
versus 12.3%). Both experiments suggest that distortions in asset allocation produce
larger welfare losses for richer households. Figure 6 confirms the above interpretation
displaying mean income profiles for individuals conditional on welfare gains. Income
for workers with welfare gains below the 5th percentile exceeds mean income (across
the whole population) at all ages. In turn, the latter is well above the income accruing
to those enjoying the largest welfare gains.
In both cases considered above, the worker is aware of unemployment traps and op-
timally chooses saving and consumption given the rule-of-thumb portfolio allocation.
Our welfare analysis concludes with the suboptimal case when the worker maximizes
expected utility oblivious of rare personal disasters. The right-hand column of Table
2 delivers an upper bound on median welfare gains from becoming aware of unem-
ployment traps (more than 200%). Mean welfare gains are even higher (642%). This
pattern derives from a much higher average consumption until age 40, leading to lower
buffer savings, for the unaware worker who chooses consumption and portfolios com-
position as in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) (see panel (b) in Figure 5). If a
long-term unemployment spell occurs, consumption and bequest drop dramatically, in
some cases almost to zero. This implies a large utility loss for a tiny share of workers,
causing a sizable increase in mean welfare loss relative to the median value. Since
close-to-zero consumption is likelier at the bottom of the income distribution, mean
welfare gains from becoming aware of traps are higher for those with low rather than
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high income, at age 64 (1024% against 218% as shown in panel (b) of Table 2). Clearly,
the earlier the traps occur, the lower is buffer wealth, the worse are the consumption
and welfare consequences. The latter observation hints at a welfare improving scheme
designed to support the fraction of workers hit by long-term unemployment when
young, along the lines suggested by Michelacci and Ruffo (2015). More generally, the
size of the welfare losses suggests to move towards schemes that protect against longer
term unemployment (see, for instance, Setty 2017).
6 Robustness
This section sheds additional light on the strength of our results, that radically depart
from the known wisdom concerning optimal life cycle behavior during working years
and hold across the entire distribution of investors.
A first robustness check concerns the sensitivity of our results to a lower probability
of personal disaster. In performing such analysis, we also allow for an asymmetric
reduction in the probability of long-term unemployment with respect to workers’ age.
Recent data from US labour market statistics indeed show that the composition of
long-term unemployment is shifting towards the elderly. In 2015 the overall and the
long-term unemployment rates were about 5.7% and 1.7% respectively, with the share
of long-term unemployment in the overall unemployment rate differing widely among
age groups: from 20% among young workers (16-24 years old), to 35% among prime
age workers (25-55), and up to 41% among older workers (over 55).
A second check regards the modelling of the link between unemployment risk during
working life and retirement income, so as to make sure that our results do not originate
exclusively from long-term unemployment occurring during the very last working years,
which heavily reduces retirement income.
Further, since previous literature highlights that the power utility function im-
plies that the worker is indifferent to intertemporal correlation of consumption shocks,
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we adopt Epstein-Zin preferences to investigate whether positive correlation aversion
boosts the impact of unemployment traps. A similar motivation pushes us to analyze
the sensitivity of the equity-investment profile to positive correlation between stock
returns and labour income shocks.
Finally, we experiment with more conservative calibrations and alternative mod-
elling of human capital erosion, so as to represent the possibility of incurring in large
losses only in deep crisis situations rather than in normal business cycle downturns.
6.1 Age-dependent unemployment risk
In this section, we calibrate our model with unemployment traps, allowing for both a
smaller and age-dependent long-term unemployment risk. We change the transition
probability from (short-term) to long-term unemployment, denoted as 12 in the
following transition probabilities matrix:
Π+1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
096 004 0
1− 12 0 12
085 0 015
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
with respect to the baseline calibration in (16) where 12 = 015 irrespective of the
worker’s age. In “case 1”, the probability of entering long-term unemployment is
reduced by one third (from 015 to 010) only for workers younger than 50 years old.
In “case 2”, we further reduce the probability of entering long-term unemployment
for very young workers, setting 12 = 0075 for workers less than 30 years old. In all
scenarios, transition probabilities are rather conservative implying steady state long-
term unemployment rates lower than the actual one. For reference, in the baseline
case, the steady state long-term unemployment rate is 08%, while it is 05% and
04%, in case 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 7 reports the life-cycle profiles for the optimal conditional stock holding
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and financial wealth accumulation when the long-term unemployment risk is age-
dependent. Compared with the baseline case, the age profile of stock investment
is only slightly modified. A lower long-term unemployment risk at young ages implies
a moderately higher stock share during prime age but does not significantly alter in-
vestors’ behavior later over the working life and during retirement, and has virtually
no effect on wealth accumulation.
6.2 Unemployment risk and retirement income
In our model, pension benefits are a fixed proportion of the last labour income earned
prior to retirement age. Such income is especially sensitive to human capital loss due
to the occurrence of long-term unemployment in years just before retirement. Thus,
we analyze whether our results are robust to changes in modelling the link between
long-term unemployment at old ages and subsequent pension provisions.
To begin with, we assume no human capital loss in the event that unemployment
occurs in the years immediately before retirement. Our simulation results show that
the flattening of the optimal stock share profile carries over to this setting, suggesting
that it is not an artifact of how we model pension income. In a second check, we take
the solution of our original model (calibrated in the case of unemployment risk with
human capital erosion) and focus on simulated life-cycle profiles for two selected groups
of agents. The first group includes workers who have experienced just one long-term
unemployment spell of 5 years over the entire working life at the beginning of their
job career (i.e. before the age of 35), whereas the other group is contains workers who
have experienced just one long-term unemployment spell of 5 years over the entire
working life but at end of their job career (i.e. after the age of 60). We find that in
both cases, average life-cycle stock share profiles exhibit the flattening property. This
experiment confirms that the flattening is due to the riskier nature of human capital,
together with the resolution of uncertainty during working age, and is not affected by
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specific assumptions on the determinants of pension income.
6.3 Boosting the effect of unemployment traps
In this section, we consider two possible avenues that might reinforce our results. The
first one is to allow for a positive correlation between stock return innovations and the
innovations in permanent labor income (  0), on top of human capital erosion.
Results in Bagliano, Fugazza and Nicodano (2014) show that a realistically small
correlation has large effects on life-cycle choices when it interacts with a higher variance
of the permanent component of labor income shocks. One may therefore expect a
similar effect in the presence of unemployment traps. Empirical estimates of the stock
return-labor income correlation differ widely even when we restrict attention to the US
economy. Cocco, Gomes andMaenhout (2005) report estimated values not significantly
different from zero across various education groups, in line with Heaton and Lucas
(2000), whose estimates range from −007 to 014. However, Campbell, Cocco, Gomes
and Maenhout (2001) find higher values, ranging from 0.33 for households with no
high-school education to 0.52 for college graduates. In the simulations below we adopt
an intermediate positive value of  = 02.
Figure 8 shows optimal portfolio shares of stocks and the pattern of financial wealth
accumulation with no correlation and with a positive correlation between labor income
shocks and stock returns. While the shape of life-cycle profiles is relatively unaffected,
the average stock share is lower at all ages. In case of positive correlation, labour
income is closer to an implicit holding of stocks, reducing the incentive to invest in
stocks at all ages. More specifically, investors are relatively more exposed to stock
market risk and will find it optimal to offset such risk by holding a lower fraction of
their financial portfolio in stocks if compared with the case of no correlation. The
stock share remains substantially flat over the whole working life, displaying limited
variability around a level of about 50%. At the retirement age of 65, human capital
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becomes riskless, since pension income is certain and therefore uncorrelated with stock
return innovations. Thus investors rebalance their portfolio towards stocks: during
retirement, the level and time profile of the stock share are very close to the case of
no correlation. Further, the relative increase in human capital risk due to a positive
correlation does not substantially alter the pattern of financial wealth accumulation.
The second experiment implements a change in preferences that allows for intertem-
poral correlation aversion (Bommier, 2007). With a power utility function, the worker
is indifferent to positive or negative intertemporal correlation of consumption lotteries
(shocks). With Epstein-Zin preferences, the worker is averse to positive correlation
when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than the inverse of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (). Adopting a recursive (Epstein-Zin) formulation
for preferences and keeping the risk aversion parameter constant ( = 5), we simulate
the model with positive ( = 05) and negative ( = 01) correlation aver-
sion, comparing the results with our baseline case of indifference (i.e. power utility,
 = 02). Figure 9 shows that aversion to positive correlation has a negligible effect
during working years, while it causes a slower wealth decumulation and less risk taking
during the retirement period, especially as death approaches. This is consistent with
the known property that higher mortality risk magnifies the effects of intertemporal
correlation aversion (Bommier, 2013).
Overall, the experiments above confirm the robustness of the flattening of the life-
cycle profile to changes in both hedging opportunities in the stock market and to
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, pointing to the dominance of the personal
disaster effect.
6.4 Sensitivity to human capital erosion
Finally, we check the sensitivity of life-cycle profiles with respect to the magnitude
of the human capital erosion effect due to long-term unemployment, captured by the
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parameter Ψ2 (set equal to 06 in our baseline calibration). Since, as discussed in
Section 3, available estimates of earnings losses due to long-term unemployment as as
low as 15% of the level of pre-displacement earnings, Figure 10 shows the results of an
experiment with the human capital erosion parameter Ψ2 in the range 02− 06. Once
this parameter falls to 04 the hump shape in the portfolio share of stocks appears
again over working life. The life-cycle profiles of both the optimal risky portfolio share
and financial wealth accumulation track closely the case of no unemployment when
the potential human capital loss is equal to 20%.
So far, the human capital erosion parameters Ψ1 and Ψ2 are set equal to constants.
However, it could be more appropriate to model them as stochastic variables. After
all, the tragic human capital consequences of the unemployment trap emerged in the
US during the Great Recession, but were less evident in the past. This may corre-
spond to high (low) realizations of Ψ2 for a large number of workers in the Great
Recession (business cycle expansions), and an intermediate value in ordinary business
cycle contractions.
The Beta distribution can be usefully employed to model the behavior of random
variables that take values limited to finite intervals. In our case, random variables
Ψ ( = 1 2) are fractions limited to the interval [0 1]. We therefore assume that
Ψ follow Beta distributions with support [0 1] and shape parameters ( ): thus,
Ψ ∼ ( ). The flexibility of the distribution enables us to concentrate nearly all
the probability mass toward the most probable values of proportional human capital
erosion, leaving the possibility of extremely unlikely realizations open. The most
revealing case is displayed in Figure 11. While Ψ1 is kept at 0, Ψ2 follows the Beta
distribution with expected value ranging between 010 and 020 and standard deviation
between 021 and 032, implying an expected 10% − 20% erosion of the individual
permanent labor income component after the second year of unemployment. More
precisely, the calibrated distribution for Ψ2 implies a median value for the proportional
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human capital erosion lower than 1%, while the 75 percentile ranges between 6% and
25%. It turns out that under all distributional assumptions, life cycle profiles are very
similar to the case of a non-random loss of human capital Ψ2 = 06.
This provides a final suggestion that extremely rare but potentially disastrous
labour income shocks may be relevant to understand cautiousness by young workers
and their limited risk taking in the stock market.
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7 Conclusions
As the recent Great Recession episode has highlighted, long-term unemployment spells
may persistently damage workers’ human capital. With this background motivation,
this paper investigates the effects of unemployment traps on life-cycle savings and
portfolio choice, introducing higher moments and non-linearities in the labour income
process. This methodological innovation delivers new insights. Even a small proba-
bility of experiencing human capital erosion due to long-term unemployment is able
to generate optimal conditional stock shares more in line with those observed in the
data. Due to the possibility of human capital loss, young workers face higher uncer-
tainty concerning future income and social security pension levels than older ones.
At the same time, young workers with continuous careers have larger human capital
than older ones. When a highly unlikely unemployment spell may potentially lead to
considerable human capital erosion, the first effect offsets the second and the optimal
investment in stocks is relatively flat over the life-cycle. This result departs from the
implications of previous models with linear income shocks highlighting the importance
of unemployment traps for the life-cycle portfolios.
Our calibrations also suggest an alternative, and more balanced, design for target-
date investment funds. Such modified design implies an average 3% -10% increase in
welfare-equivalent annual consumption, depending on the benchmark age rule. This
more balanced design fits different kinds of workers, given the limited heterogeneity
in life cycle investments induced by the threat of personal disasters. More generally,
our analysis indicates that the pattern of risk taking at different ages in Target Date
Funds should be related to the share of uninsured long-term employment risk.
Our analysis implies that we should observe changes in the life-cycle profile of
household portfolios, both across cohorts and across countries, in response to the
coverage of long term unemployment. Clearly there are other sources of human capital
erosion, as well as other partial insurance vehicles. The optimal flat asset allocation
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will extend to such scenarios to the extent that such additional shocks remain partially
uninsured by additional hedges, and that they have worse consequences the earlier they
hit the worker.
35
References
[1] Ameriks, J., and S. P. Zeldes (2004), How Do Household Portfolio Shares Vary
with Age?, Working paper, Columbia University.
[2] Arulampalam W., A.L. Booth and M.P. Taylor (2000), Unemployment persis-
tence, Oxford Economic Papers 52(1): 24—50.
[3] Arulampalam W. (2001), Is unemployment really scarring? Effects of unemploy-
ment experiences on wages, Economic Journal 111(475): F585—606.
[4] Bagliano F. C., C. Fugazza and G. Nicodano (2014), Optimal life-cycle portfolios
for heterogeneous workers, Review of Finance, 18(6): 2283-2323.
[5] Barro R.(2006), Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(3): 823-866.
[6] Blundell R. (2014), Income Dynamics and Life-Cycle Inequality: Mechanisms and
Controversies, Economic Journal, 124: 289-318.
[7] Bodie Z., R.C. Merton and W. Samuelson (1992), Labour Supply Flexibility and
Portfolio Choice in a Life Cycle Model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol, 16: 427-449.
[8] Bodie Z, J. Treussard and P.S. Willen (2007), The theory of life-cycle saving and
investing, Public Policy Discussion Paper 07-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
[9] Bommier A. (2007), Risk Aversion, Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution and
Correlation Aversion, Economics Bullettin, 4(29): 1-8.
[10] Bommier A. (2013), Life-Cycle Preferences Revisited, Journal of the European
Economic Association, 11(6): 1290-1319.
[11] Bremus F. M. and V. Kuzin (2014), Unemployment and portfolio choice: Does
persistence matter?, Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 40(C): 99-113.
[12] Campbell J. Y., J. Cocco, F. Gomes and P. Maenhout (2001), Investing Retire-
ment Wealth: a Life-Cycle Model, in Campbell J.Y. and M. Feldstein (eds.), Risk
Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, University of Chicago Press.
[13] Cocco J., F. Gomes and P. Maenhout (2005), Consumption and Portfolio Choice
over the Life Cycle, Review of Financial Studies, 18: 491-533.
[14] Cooper E. (2013), The Effect of Unemployment Duration on Future Earnings and
OtherOutcomes, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 13-8.
[15] Couch K. A. and D. W. Placzek (2010), Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers
Revisited, American Economic Review, 100(1): 572-89.
36
[16] Davis S. J., and T. von Wachter (2011), Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 43(2): 1—72.
[17] Edin P. A. and M. Gustavsson (2008), Time Out of Work and Skill Depreciation,
Industrial Labor Relations Review, 61(2): 163-180.
[18] Fagereng, A., L. Guiso and C. Gottlieb (2017), Asset Market Participation and
Portfolio Choice over the Life-Cycle, Journal of Finance, 72(2): 705-750.
[19] Ghayad R. and W. Dickens (2012), What Can We Learn by Disaggregating the
Unemployment-Vacancy Relationship?, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public
Policy Brief 12-3.
[20] Gomes F.J., L.J. Kotlikoff and L.M. Viceira (2008), Optimal Life-Cycle Investing
with Flexible labour Supply: A Welfare Analysis of Life-Cycle Funds, American
Economic Review, 98(2): 297-303.
[21] Gomes F.J. and A. Michaelides (2005), Optimal Life-Cycle Asset Alloca-
tion:Understanding the Empirical Evidence, Journal of Finance, 60(2): 869-904.
[22] Guidolin M. and A. Timmermann (2008), International asset allocation under
regime switching, skew, and kurtosis preferences, Review of Financial Studies,
21(2), 889-935.
[23] Guvenen F., F. Karahan, S. Ozkan and J. Song (2016), What Do Data on Millions
of U.S. Workers Reveal About Life-Cycle Earnings Dynamics?, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Staff Report n. 710.,
[24] Jacobson L., R. LaLonde and D. Sullivan (1993a), Earnings Losses of Displaced
Workers, American Economic Review, 83(4): 685-709.
[25] Jacobson L., R. LaLonde and D. Sullivan (1993b), The Costs of Worker Disloca-
tion. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
[26] Jacobson L., R. LaLonde and D. Sullivan (2005), Estimating the Returns to Com-
munity College Schooling for Displaced Workers, Journal of Econometrics, 125(1-
2): 271—304.
[27] Heaton, J. and D. Lucas (2000), Portfolio Choice and Asset Prices: The Impor-
tance of Entrepreneurial Risk, Journal of Finance, 55(3): 1163-1198.
[28] Hubbard G.R., Skinner J. and Zeldes S.F. (1995) Precautionary Saving and Social
Insurance. Journal of Political Economy 103(2), 360-399
[29] Hubener A., R.Maurer and O. S. Mitchell (2016), How Family Status and Social
Security Claiming Options Shape Optimal Life Cycle Portfolios, The Review of
Financial Studies, 29, (4): 937—978.
[30] Keane M. P. and K. I. Wolpin (1997),The Career Decisions of Young Men, Journal
of Political Economy, 105(3): 473—522.
37
[31] Kroft K., F. Lange, M.J. Notowidigdo and L. Katz (2016), Long Term Unemploy-
ment and the Great Recession: the Role of Composition, Duration Dependence,
and Non Participation, Journal of Labour Economics, 34(S1): S7-S54.
[32] Krueger A. B., J. Cramer and D. Cho (2014), Are the Long-Term Unemployed
on the Margins of the Labor Market?, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Spring: 229-280.
[33] Love D. (2013), Optimal Rules of Thumb for Consumption and Portfolio Choice,
Economic Journal, 123: 932-961.
[34] Love D. (2006), Buffer Stock Saving in Retirement Accounts, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 53(7): 1473-1492.
[35] Low A., Meghir C. and L.Pistaferri (2010), Wage Risk and Employment Risk over
the Life Cycle, American Economic Review,
[36] Machin S. and A. Manning (1999), The Causes and Consequences of Long-Term
Unemployment in Europe, in O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labour
Economics, 3, Part C: 3085—3139.
[37] Mayer G. (2014), The Trend in Long-Term Unemployment and Characteristics of
Workers Unemployed for Two Years or More, Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service
[38] Michaelides A. and Y. Zhang (2017), Stock Market Mean Reversion and Portfolio
Choice over the Life Cycle, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(3):
1183-1209.
[39] Michelacci C. and H. Ruffo (2015), Optimal Life Cycle Unemployment Insurance,
American Economic Review, 105(2): 816-859.
[40] Neal D. (1995), Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence fromDisplacedWork-
ers, Journal of Labor Economics, 13(4): 653-677.
[41] Ruhm C. J. (1991), Are Workers Permanently Scarred by Job Displacements?,
American Economic Review, 81(1): 319—24.
[42] Schmidt, L. D. W. (2016), Climbing and Falling Off the Ladder: Asset Pricing
Implications of Labor Market Event Risk. Available at SSRN
[43] Schmieder J.F., T. von Wachter, and S. Bender (2016), The Effect of Unemploy-
ment Benefits and Nonemployment Durations on Wages, American Economic
Review, 106(3): 739-77.
[44] Setty O. (2017), Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Accounts: The
Best of BothWorlds, Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.
[45] Viceira L.M. (2001), Optimal Portfolio Choice for Long-Horizon Investors with
Nontradable Labor Income, The Journal of Finance, 56: 433—470.
38
39 
 
Table 1.   Calibration parameters 
This table reports benchmark values of relevant parameters. 
Working life (max) 20 -65 
Retirement (max) 65 -100 
Discount factor  (β) 0.96 
Risk aversion (γ) 5 
Replacement ratio  (λ) 0.68 
Variance of permanent shocks to labour income  (σ2ε) 0.0106 
Variance of transitory shocks to labour income  (σ2n) 0.0738 
Riskless rate 2% 
Excess returns on stocks  (µs) 4% 
Variance of stock returns innovations   (σ2s) 0.025 
Stock ret./permanent lab. income shock correlation    ( ρsY) 0  
 
 No unemployment 
risk 
Unemployment risk 
     with no traps 
Unemployment traps 
Unemployment benefits    
Short term unemployed ( ξ1) - 0.3 0.3 
Long term unemployed (ξ2) - 0 0 
    
Human capital erosion    
Short term unemployed (Ψ1) - - 0 
Long term unemployed (Ψ2) - - 0.6 
 
 
Table 2.   Welfare gains 
This table reports welfare gains (in percentage points) due to the adoption of optimal choices instead of suboptimal ones. 
The first and second columns display gains from respectively abandoning suboptimal “Age” and “Target Date Fund” 
rules for asset allocation. The third column refers to gains deriving from taking account of unemployment traps in the 
optimization process. Panel (a) displays the distribution of welfare gains. Panel (b) compares mean gains for workers with 
income at age 64 below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile of income distribution. 
 Age Rule TDF rule Unaware of Traps 
a.  Distribution of welfare gains (% points) 
Mean 3.3 12.0 642.5 
Median 3.3 11.8 215.8 
5th 1.5 8.0 -40.5 
95th 5.4 17.0 573.6 
 
b.  Welfare gains conditional on income at age 64 (% points) 
Below 5th percentile 1.6 9.5 1024.0 
Above 95th percentile 2.4 12.3 218.2 
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Figure 1.    Policy functions 
This figure shows the portfolio rules for stocks as a function of cash on hand for an average level of the stochastic 
permanent labor income component. The policies refer to selected ages: 20, 40, and 70. Panel (a) and (b) refer to the case 
without unemployment risk and with unemployment traps, respectively. In the latter, the parameters governing the human 
capital erosion during short-term and long-term unemployment spells are Ψ1=0 and Ψ2=0.6. 
 
a. No unemployment risk  
 
 
b. Unemployment traps 
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Figure 2.   Life-cycle average profiles  
This figure displays the mean simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle profiles. Age 
ranges from 20 to 100. The three cases correspond to no unemployment risk (dotted line); unemployment risk with no 
traps (dashed line); unemployment risk with traps, with human capital erosion Ψ1=0 and Ψ2=0.6 (solid line).  
         (a)           (b) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.   Life-cycle profiles of the savings rate    
This figure displays the savings dynamics for individuals of age 20 to 100, relative to total income (i.e. labor income plus 
financial income). The two cases correspond to no unemployment risk (dotted line) and unemployment trap with human 
capital erosion: Ψ1=0 and Ψ2=0.6 (solid line). 
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Figure 4.   Life-cycle percentile profiles 
This figure displays the distribution of simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle profiles 
for individuals of age 20 to 100 in the case of unemployment risk (panel (a)) and unemployment traps (panel (b)). The 
parameters governing the human capital erosion during short-term and long-term unemployment spells are Ψ1=0 and 
Ψ2=0.6.  
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Figure 5.    Optimal and suboptimal life-cycle profiles 
This figure contrasts the optimal (solid line) and suboptimal life cycle profiles (dotted line: “Age Rule”;  dashed-dotted 
line: “Target Date Fund rule”; dashed line: “unaware of traps”, i.e. optimization without taking into account the existence 
of unemployment traps). 
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Figure 6.     Income profiles conditional on welfare gains. 
This figure displays mean income profiles for individuals conditional on welfare gains from becoming aware of traps. 
The dotted line represents the mean income profile for individuals with welfare gain below the 5-th percentile. The solid 
and dash-dotted lines refer to individuals with welfare gains respectively at the average and above the 95th percentile. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.   Life-cycle profiles with unemployment traps: age-dependent long-term   
       unemployment risk 
This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle profiles for 
individuals of age 20 to 100. The probability of entering long-term unemployment for an unemployed worker is set to 
0.15 in the baseline case, to 0.10 only for workers younger than 50 in Case 1, to 0.10 for all workers in Case 2. Human 
capital erosion: Ψ1=0 and Ψ2=0.6.  
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Figure 8.   Life-cycle profiles with unemployment traps: positive correlation between labor 
       income and stock returns 
 
This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle profiles for 
individuals of age 20 to 100. Human capital erosion: Ψ1=0 and Ψ2=0.6. Positive correlation between labor income shocks 
and innovation to stock returns: ρsY =0.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.    Life-cycle profiles with unemployment traps: recursive preferences 
 
This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle profiles for 
individuals of age 20 to 100. Preferences over consumption are recursive, represented by an Epstein Zin utility function. 
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution varies from 0.1 to 0.5. Human capital erosion: Ψ1=0 and Ψ2=0.6. 
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Figure 10.    Life-cycle profiles with unemployment traps: sensitivity to human capital erosion 
 
This figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle profiles for 
individuals of age 20 to 100. Various cases are considered: no unemployment risk; unemployment traps with alternative 
values of human capital erosion, with Ψ2 decreasing from 0.6 to 0.2 (Ψ1=0  in all cases ).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.    Life-cycle profiles with unemployment traps: stochastic human capital erosion 
 
The figure displays the average simulated stock investment and financial wealth accumulation life-cycle profiles for 
individuals of age 20 to 100. Various cases are considered: no unemployment risk; unemployment traps with deterministic 
human capital erosion (Ψ1=0 an d Ψ2 = 0.6), unemployment traps and stochastic human capital erosion. In the latter case, 
Ψ1=0 and Ψ2  follows a beta distribution with shape parameters a and b. In particular, a=0.1 and b=0.4, 0.7 and 0.9, 
implying an expected value for Ψ2 equal to 0.20, 0.12 and 0.10, respectively. 
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